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Abstract 
After providing a brief background as to why issues of diversity management 
within armed forces have become important internatio lly, this article outlines the 
diversity challenges facing the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). 
The first part of the article describes how the racial, language/ethnic and gender 
profile of the SANDF has changed since 1994 and the tensions this has evoked. The 
second part provides a brief conceptual framework against which diversity 
management in the SANDF can be interpreted, whereaft r the various diversity 
management programmes instituted over the years to cultivate a respect for diversity 
are outlined. It is argued that the predominant emphasis on ‘workplace diversity’ at 
the cost of ‘valuing diversity’ has meant that existing stereotypes and tensions 
within the ranks have remained, with dire consequences not only for the 
cohesiveness and effectiveness of the SANDF, but also for civil-military relations. 
Introduction 
Managing diversity has become a major theme in the contemporary world, not 
least within the armed forces, which have not only become more diverse in terms of 
race and gender, but which are frequently deployed together with or within other 
nations. However, the manner in which armed forces deal with diversity issues differ 
substantially, as they are largely influenced by the political, cultural and ethnic 
influences emanating from broader society (Soeters and Van der Meulen 2007). Yet, 
                                                
1 The author wishes to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their useful 
comments and critique, which have greatly improved the content and quality of this 
article. 
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despite these differences, there are a number of universal reasons why diversity 
management has assumed greater ‘political’ prominence i  military affairs since the 
end of the Cold War.  
The first stems from the emphasis placed on individual rights that have obliged 
armed forces to review policies and practices that discriminate against women, 
homosexuals and ethnic minorities. In most cases, these reforms have been driven 
by lobby groups or legislative impediments. With resp ct to South Africa, it has not 
been lobby groups per se, but rather the need to conform to the legal imperatives 
spelt out in the new Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which forbids 
discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, gender and sexual orientation, 
religion and language, among others, which have driven policy reforms (Heinecken 
2007:79-80).  
A second reason why armed forces are pressured to become more representative 
is to preserve their legitimacy among key stake-holders in broader society. In many 
countries, it is a democratic imperative that the armed forces are broadly 
representative of the populace with respect to race, ethnic composition, social class, 
religion and gender (Baynam 1990:9-10). The general assumption is that control of 
the armed forces is more or less guaranteed as long as all segments of society are 
represented. In South Africa, the White Paper on Defence specifically states that “to 
secure the legitimacy of the armed forces, the Department of Defence is committed 
to the goal of overcoming the legacy of racial and gender discrimination” and that it 
will seek to create “a Defence Force that is professional, efficient, effective and 
broadly representative” (DOD 1996:32). In this regard, militaries have not only 
assumed an important ‘nationalising’ role, but have lso served as an instrument to 
uplift the poorer and less educated segments of society, in some cases becoming the 
“school of the nation” (Soeters and Van der Meulen 1999:212). 
A third reason why armed forces have become more concerned with issues of 
diversity is the growing problems of recruitment and retention associated with the 
shift to an all-volunteer force. A number of countries, for example, Canada, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to name but a few, have seen a 
decline in white male recruitment. Shortages, particularly in the technical and 
combat positions in the army, air force and navy are observed across nations. This 
has obliged armed forces to recruit from non-traditional pools, namely ethnic 
minorities (and even foreign nationals) and women, to meet their manpower 
requirements. Dandeker and Mason (2007:142-143) call this the “self-interest or 
business case” for diversity, which is driven by need, not altruism. In South Africa, 
we see similar declines in white male recruitment ad difficulties in recruiting 
members with the necessary skills, especially those of ‘colour’. However, here the 
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need to correct past racial imbalances has tended to be more important than the need 
to attract and retain the necessary skills. 
A fourth argument in favour of greater diversity is the argument that it improves 
the effectiveness of armed forces, especially in the field of humanitarian missions 
and in terms of civil-military cooperation. There is growing evidence that a better 
gender/racial mix is more suited for non-combat missions, especially in their 
interaction with local communities. In terms of women’s participation in 
peacekeeping missions, their contribution assumed gr ater importance with the 
passing of United Nations Resolution 1325 in 2000. This Resolution has reaffirmed 
the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in 
peacekeeping, and called for gender mainstreaming to be incorporated in all multi-
national peace operations, as not only something that is beneficial, but essential. In 
South Africa, this has given fresh momentum to the greater recruitment of women, 
with targets being set at 30% and even higher.2 
A fifth and further reason why some armed forces have been obliged to deal 
with issues of diversity, relates to the integration f previously adverse military 
groups, often from different ethnic or ideological b ckgrounds, to build a new army 
after a change in the political dispensation (Soeters and Van der Meulen 1999:213-
4). We see this occurring for example in Germany after the end of the Cold War and 
in Eritrea and South Africa after years of liberation wars (Tessema 2007:101-108). 
This brings an added dimension to diversity management, that of political ideology 
and past loyalties that have a powerful influence on workplace relations. This has 
meant that managing diversity has become more than just accommodating diverse 
groups, but dealing with the underlying tensions that cultural and ideological 
differences bring. 
In many respects, South Africa represents a microcosm f the issues armed 
forces have to deal with in terms of diversity management, albeit with some unique 
differences. Hence, the aim of this article is to pr vide an overview of how the South 
African National Defence Force (SANDF) has dealt wih the issue of diversity 
management. The first section of the article describes how the racial, 
language/ethnic and gender profile of the SANDF has changed since 1994, and the 
tensions this has evoked. The second section provides a brief conceptual framework 
                                                
2 At the recent DOD Gender Conference on Soliciting male colleagues support in 
pursuit of gender equality, St George’s Hotel, Pretoria 20-22 August 2008, it was 
argued that, because of attrition, it is necessary to increase the recruitment of the 
number of women to 40%. This aspect of diversity management is the subject of 
another research project and will not be discussed in etail in this article (see 
Heinecken and Van der Waag 2007). 
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against which diversity management in the SANDF canbe interpreted, whereafter 
the various diversity management programmes instituted over the years to cultivate a 
respect for diversity are outlined. The argument is made that the overriding emphasis 
on creating a representative military has been at the expense of valuing diversity, 
which has not only harmed work relations, but which may also have dire 
consequences for the long-term effectiveness of the SANDF and for civil-military 
relations.  
A diverse society, a representative military 
While in most countries the management of diversity has meant accommodating 
minorities, in South Africa this has involved the integration of the majority black 
population3 into a minority white-dominated workplace. Years of discrimination 
denied many blacks access to certain jobs and sector  of society, including the 
military. This was to change radically when the African National Congress (ANC) 
came into power in 1994. Since then the government has systematically set about 
not only repealing various racially discriminatory laws, but also implementing others 
that would correct the past social and economic inequalities caused by decades of 
colonialism and apartheid. This included an assertive affirmative action (AA) and 
equal opportunities (EO) programme that would change the racial, ethnic and gender 
profile of the South African armed forces forever, as reflected in the following 
section. 
Racial profile 
South Africa has a multiracial and multiethnic population of 47,9 million of 
which black Africans (hereafter Africans) constitute 79,6% of the population, whites 
9,1%, coloureds 8,9% and Asians 2,4%. Thus, four out of five South Africans are 
(black) Africans. Whereas the former South African Defence Force’s (SADF) 
permanent force of the early nineties was mostly white, this was to change 
significantly with the integration of the former revolutionary and Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC) Defence Forces from 1994, but was 
still some way off the targets set by the Defence Review in 1996 (see Table 1). 
                                                
3 Within the South African context, ‘blacks’ refers to all those other than whites, 
namely Africans, coloureds, Indians and, more recently, Chinese. 
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Africans 79,6 64,7 39,2 69,7 
Coloureds 8,9 10,2 12,6 11,5 
Asians 2,4 0,75 1,3 1,2 
Whites 9,1 25,4 46,8 17,7 
The Defence Review set quotas of 64,5% Africans, coloureds 10,2%, Asians 
0,75%, and Whites 25,4%. These targets have been met, and by October 2007, the 
SANDF (uniformed component) consisted of Africans 69,7%, coloureds 11,5%, 
Asians 1,2% and whites 17,7%. This marks a radical shift in the racial profile of the 
SANDF where whites are now in effect under-represented according to the set 
targets while Africans are over-represented.5 However, this racial profile is not 
reflected at all the different rank groups and professional branches in the SANDF. 
At the operational level, (middle management) whites still made up more than half 
of the officer and non-commissioned ranks. Yet, at the lower levels, only 2% of 
privates were whites, while almost 90% were Africans.  
Language/ethnic profile 
South Africa is not only a racially, but also an ethnically diverse society. As the 
SANDF does not keep statistics by ethnic group, onecan get a sense of this by 
examining ethnicity with reference to language prefer nce.6 Whites are generally 
Afrikaans or English speakers,7 while Africans belong to any of the following nine 
different ethnic groups: Zulu, Xhosa, Pedi, Sotho, Tswana, Tsonga, Swazi, Ndebele 
and Venda, all with their own languages.  
                                                
4 Figures may not add up to 100% due to rounding off. Figures provided in 
Department of Defence, 2006. Annual Report, Financial Year 2005-2006, Military 
Printing Press, Pretoria, p. 12. 
5 The statistics quoted here are for Defence Act Personnel (SANDF) only and 
exclude civilians working in the Department of Defenc  (Public Servant Act 
Personnel). 
6 As many may be of mixed origin, language preference can be seen as an indicator 
of identifying with a specific racial/ethnic group. 
7 Whites may predominantly speak either English or Af ikaans but may not 
necessarily classify themselves as either English (British) or as Afrikaners given 
their diverse heritage. 
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Currently there are 11 official languages,8 of which most speak [1] IsiZulu 
(23,8%), followed by [2] IsiXhosa (17,6%), [3] Afrikaans (13,3%), [4] Sepedi 
(9,4%) [5] Setswana (8,2%), [6] Sesotho (7,9%), [7] Xitsonga (4,4%), [8] SiSwati 
(2,7%), [9] Tshivenda (2,3%) and [10] IsiNdebele (1,6%). Although English [11] is 
the official language of communication, only 8.2% cite this as their first language 
(SSA 2007). Language is also region-specific, for example in KwaZulu-Natal most 
Africans speak IsiZulu, in the Eastern Cape, IsiXhosa and in the Western Cape the 
coloured community speaks mostly Afrikaans. As reflected in the statistics provided, 
vast discrepancies exist between the national and the DOD language profile (Table 
2). In October 2007, 8,3% members of the DOD indicated IsiZulu as their first 
language, 9% IsiXhosa, 23,6% Afrikaans, 7,5% Sepedi, 8,3% Setswana, 5,7% 
Sesotho, 1,6% Xitsonga, 2,1% SiSwati, 3% Tshivenda, 0,5% IsiNdebele, and 10,3% 
English (DOD 2007). 
Table 2: Language profile of general population andDepartment of Defence 
Language 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Population 23,8 17,6 13,3 9,4 8,2 7,9 4,4 2,7 2,3 1,6 8,2 
DOD 8,3 9,0 23,6 7,5 8,3 5,7 1,6 2,1 3,0 0,5 10,3 
Concerning the language profile of the DOD, Zulus are significantly under-
represented while Afrikaans speakers are over-repres nt d. This is a legacy of the 
past as most former SADF members were Afrikaans-speaking and so are many 
civilian employees and coloureds serving in the DOD. For many Africans, Afrikaans 
is still negatively associated with apartheid. Given that almost a quarter of those 
serving in the DOD cite Afrikaans as their first language, it is still widely spoken in 
the SANDF, particularly in the South African Army, which is the largest arm of 
service. While many Africans who served in the forme  SADF could speak 
Afrikaans, the same does not apply for many integrat d into and joining the SANDF 
after 1994.9 
                                                
8 Language profile as recorded at last population census 2001. 
9 Afrikaans was (and for some still is) considered the language of the oppressor and 
many Africans resisted been taught in Afrikaans and those who were in exile during 
the years of apartheid had little exposure to the language. 
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As the Constitution10 prohibits discrimination on the basis of language, the 
Department of Defence was obliged to formulate a langu ge policy based on what it 
called “thread” and “link” languages. For the purposes of command and control, 
English is the official thread language for defence communication, supported by the 
appropriate link language (dominant language of region, zone, command, formation 
or unit). In practice, English and Afrikaans overshadow the other languages, and 
equitable language treatment does not translate into equality. Language is an 
important source of power, and English is often the second or third language of 
Africans. Consequently, they are at a disadvantage, especially where linguistic 
shortcomings are construed as a sign of intellectual inferiority, when in fact it is 
merely an inability to express oneself adequately.  
In addition, language usage perpetuates other stereotypes that undermine the 
achievement of equality (Human 1996:61). Frequently, the status and intellect of 
persons are judged by their accent across the colour bar – whether black or white. 
For example, if Africans have a European rather than an African English accent they 
are often regarded as “coconuts” – black on the outside, but white on the inside (thus 
part of them). In turn, whites tend to judge such Africans as more educated and 
competent.11 Few whites speak the different African languages and just as Africans 
who cannot speak Afrikaans feel alienated by its continued use, so do whites when 
Africans speak in their home language.  
Educational disparities 
Another divisive issue is the vast disparities in educational profile of the 
different racial groups. The majority of South Africans grew up in segregated 
communities and schools where the quantity and quality of education varied 
significantly. Statistics for 2007 on educational attainment of those aged 25 years 
and older indicate that fewer than 6% of Africans ad coloured women have a post-
school education. In comparison, 36% of white men have a higher qualification and 
29% of white women. An estimated 18% of African women and 13% of African 
men have no formal schooling. Consequently, it is not surprising that the 
                                                
10 The Constitution of the RSA, Act No 108 of 1996 makes it clear that “every 
person shall have the right to use the language of his or her choice (Section 30); that 
no person shall be unfairly discriminated directly or indirectly against on the basis 
of, among others, language (Section 9[3]); and further hat each person has the right 
“to receive education in the official language or languages of their choice in public 
educational institutions” (Section 29 [2]). 
11 This is something I have observed in my 17 years of service in the Department of 
Defence and which was confirmed in discussions withothers on the topic. 
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unemployment rate is highest among African women (32%) and African men (29%) 
and lowest among white males (5%) (SSA 2007:23-25). 
Comparing this with the overall educational profile of the Department of 
Defence (DOD), reveals stark disparities. Of those whose educational qualifications 
have been captured on the DOD personnel database, only 4,7% have some form of 
higher education (degree, diploma or technical qualific tion), of which 61% are 
whites, 12% coloureds, 2% Indian and 25% Africans. While these statistics should 
be read with some caution, as 33% of DOD members’ lvel of education has not 
been recorded in the personnel database, they nonetheless illustrate the discrepancies 
in education based on the available data.12 This has a significant impact on the 
management of diversity, as poor education often cotributes to feelings of 
incompetence.  
With reference to the SANDF, Menon and Kotze (2007:86) report that Africans 
find it “difficult to lead well-educated and trained white subordinates, and 
experienced a sense of disempowerment”. Exacerbating th s is that whites are said to 
consider “blacks inherently less capable, innately inferior and intellectually limited” 
and have doubts about their capabilities when in positions of power and authority 
(Human 1996:54-55). Unfortunately, these perceptions f racial incompetence are 
often made worse by AA, where blacks are perceived to have been promoted to high 
positions without the necessary experience and/or training. 
Managing diversity: Explaining the concepts  
All these issues have complicated diversity management in the SANDF. Before 
discussing this, it is necessary to clarify the useof certain terms that are frequently 
confused. Often the terms ‘affirmative action’, ‘employment equity’ and ‘managing 
diversity’ are used interchangeably, whereas in effect they mean different things. 
Affirmative action (AA)  is a politically driven programme that includes laws, 
programmes and activities designed to redress past imbalances and ameliorate the 
conditions of specified groups who have been disadvantaged on the grounds of race, 
gender and disability (Uys 2003:32). AA is the process used to achieve the desired 
outcome of greater equality of opportunity and ultimately, employment equity. One 
of the means to ensure employment equity, according to the Employment Equity Act 
of 1998 (Section 2) is the systematic “elimination f unfair discrimination and the 
                                                
12 Of the total number of 76 159 uniformed and civilian personnel serving in the 
Department of Defence, the educational level of 24 908 (almost 33%) was not 
recorded. The statistics calculated are for those whose education has been recorded. 
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establishment of specific measures to accelerate the advancement of those 
previously disadvantaged”.  
Both AA and EO are aimed at creating employment opportunities and ensuring 
the promotion of those previously disadvantaged. AA is therefore seen as a means of 
correcting historical injustices and an attempt to level the playing fields where 
everyone can compete on an equal basis, thereby achieving employment equity 
(Thomas 1996:6). This is why AA has often been equated with terms such as 
‘corrective action’, ‘black advancement’ or ‘positive action’ (Uys 2003:32). AA is 
not a proactive strategy, but a reactive strategy based on statutory and moral 
imperatives that compel organisations to include women and other groups into the 
mainstream. According to Thomas (1991:18-21), historically this process has 
evolved through different phases: the passive and the pipeline or hierarchy scenario.  
The ‘passive scenario’ is found where organisations take the necessary steps to 
ensure compliance to AA policy and to eliminate blatant racism and sexism within 
the workplace with the assumption that this will create equal opportunity. When 
women and blacks fail to advance, they blame this on a lack of experience or 
education, but fail to implement any form of remedial action as this is regarded as 
constituting reverse discrimination or preferential reatment. The ‘pipeline scenario’ 
moves beyond the intervention-free approach to increase the number of previously 
disadvantaged groups by supporting development programmes. However, this 
approach is still based on the assumption that a poor educational background or lack 
of preparation is the major barrier to upward mobility. The ‘upward hierarchical or 
mobility scenario’ is motivated by moral considerations. Organisations adopting this 
approach to AA actively recruit and promote women and blacks by providing 
‘special’ training, setting targets for the number to be developed and promoting and 
setting up mentoring and tracking systems. The way the SANDF has approached AA 
has progressively moved towards this latter approach. 
Whatever the approach, the underlying assumption of all AA initiatives is that 
interventions are necessary to ‘better equip’ blacks and women for corporate life. 
According to Thomas (1991:23), “AAs intent was to fulfil a legal, moral, and social 
responsibility by initiating ‘special’ efforts to ensure the creation of a diverse 
workforce and encourage upward mobility for minorities and women”. In the case of 
the dominant group, white males, this process is often seen as reverse discrimination 
and preferential treatment. As AA embodies a form of discrimination it often leads 
to resentment and tension, especially where the focus is on getting the numbers 
right, instead of valuing diversity (Thomas 1991:24). 
While AA contributes to an increase in workforce diversity, the process itself 
does not encourage awareness and respect for diversity in the workplace. Often 
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managing diversity and affirmative action is considered as one, but this is incorrect. 
Managing diversity as an organisational strategy that “seeks to harness and capitalise 
on sensitivity to gender, racial, cultural and other more salient differences to create a 
more dynamic and competitive organisational culture” (Uys 2003:33). This 
encompasses a range of activities aimed at making managers or leadership more 
aware of the values and assumptions of different diverse groups, which may affect 
the way they “cooperate, compete, communicate, plan, organize and are motivated” 
(Horwitz, Bowmaker-Falconer and Searll 1996:139). The ultimate aim is to develop 
an organisational environment in which all employees can contribute to the strategic 
and competitive advantage of the organisation (Thomas 1996:10). Failure to 
assimilate and manage diversity can, according to Horwitz et al. (1996:140) lead to 
“misconceptions, poor work relations, underperformance and discrimination”. 
Managing diversity is a multifaceted concept and embraces the recognition and 
value of cultural diversity. However the problem with many managing diversity 
initiatives is that they often reinforce underlying stereotypes by focusing on national 
or ethnic culture and not on the relevance of cultura  differences that can improve 
“cultural knowledge” (Human 2005:14). According to Human (2005:14), this has 
given rise to a tension between those who have adopte  a more generalised (or 
maximalist) approach to diversity training, using nationality, ethnic, religious or 
gender (such as Hofstede) in diversity training, and those who have adopted a more 
detailed (minimalist) approach, which tries to identify other cross-cutting cultural 
and social variables, such as education, language and social class that impact on 
diversity management.  
Given the complexity of this subject, one can understand why “many so-called 
managing diversity programmes not only confuse the relationship between 
managing diversity and affirmative action and employment equity, but also confuse 
managing diversity with managing culture” (Human 1996:51). In the SANDF, the 
focus has been primarily on workplace diversity to meet equity targets, although 
there have been some remarkable attempts to introduce programmes that attempt to 
create awareness and respect for cultural diversity. 
Workforce diversity versus managing diversity 
According to Menon and Kotze (2007), the SANDF has adopted a ‘hard’ 
approach to diversity management, which has tended to quate managing workplace 
diversity with affirmative action. This has meant that other cross-cutting social 
variables, such as education, language, cultural and political differences that underlie 
existing tensions across race and gender, have often not been adequately addressed. 
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In the following section, I attempt to explain how the emphasis on workplace 
diversity or ‘representivity’ has influenced work relations in the SANDF. 
Affirmative action, integration and political expedience 
Since the formation of the SANDF in April 1994, the transformation process has 
been dominated by the need to reform the racial and gender profile of the armed 
forces (Heinecken 2005:74-96). This approach was supported by statutory 
intervention in terms of AA and EO legislation, whic  has effectively changed the 
racial profile of the SANDF, with the added political twist that many of the new 
military leaders are from the former revolutionary forces. To illustrate this, by April 
1997 after integration13 was complete, the senior-command leadership position  
Brigadier-General to General within the SANDF comprised of MK (14%) officers, 
APLA (1%), TBVC (4%) and SADF (81%). By October 2007, whilst comprising 
only 19% of the total force strength of the SANDF, former MK and APLA 
represented 46% of officers in senior-command leadership, whilst former SADF 
members represented 47% and the homeland armies 7%.14 









Brig-Gen – Gen 
MK 15 14 13 37 
APLA 5 1 6 9 
TBVC 11 4 7 7 
SADF 58 81 32 47 
SANDF* 11 0 42 0 
Note: *The SANDF composition reflects those who joined the SANDF after 1994 
and who had no former force affiliation.  
                                                
13 Integration refers to the amalgamation of the four former homeland armies, 
namely the Transkei Defence Force (TDF), Bophuthatswna Defence Force (BFD), 
Venda Defence Force (VDM) and Ciskei Defence Force (CDF) (collectively known 
as the TBVC forces) and the former non-statutory revolutionary forces of Umkhonto 
we Sizwe (MK), the liberation army of the ANC and the Azanian People’s 
Liberation Army (APLA) of the black consciousness Pan African Congress (PAC), 
which collectively formed the new South African National Defence Force in April 
1994. Included later was the KwaZulu Self-Protection Force (KZSPF) of the Inkhata 
Freedom Party (IFP).  
14 Figures for KZSPF not provided in latest statistics.  
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This transfer of racial/political power has acute implications for race relations 
within the SANDF. Former SADF officers tend to be conformist, authoritarian and 
bureaucratic. In contrast, former revolutionary officers operated in a culture free 
from rigid regulations and prescribed channels, they valued initiative and were 
highly politicised. This has led to a clash in leadrship styles where former MK and 
APLA officers still tend to rely on their former networks for information, advice and 
support rather than channelling issues through the c ain of command. Former 
loyalties continue to persist to the extent that “cadres often refuse to testify against 
each other” (Setai Report 2001). This not only impacts negatively on discipline and 
morale, but also disrupts the chain of command. Consequently, Van Ryneveld 
(2006:13) claims that “the centuries-old military principle of unified command has 
been lost”. This is exacerbated by the fact that whi e officers are often reluctant to 
take disciplinary action for fear of reprisal, of being accused of being racist or due to 
the repercussions this may have for their own careers (Heinecken, Nel and Janse van 
Vuuren 2003:93).  
As reflected in Table 3, former non-statutory forces have benefited greatly from 
AA and, according to Honey (2003:29), many loyal guerrilla fighters have been 
rewarded with high ranks, often without due consideration of experience, skills or 
age. Many have little experience of managing a bureaucracy or planning large-scale 
military operations and this has given rise to considerable tension among whites, 
who perceive that military competency has been sacrificed for the sake of political 
expediency. South African Air Force (SAAF) instructors and former fighter pilots, 
for example, say that the relaxation of standards where pupils who only manage a 
40% pass rate still qualify as fighter pilots is “nothing short of a death sentence” 
(Makings 2004:38).  
The Air Force and Navy face serious challenges as pilots, sea-going officers, 
engineers and highly skilled technicians leave and cannot be replaced with persons 
of colour. This has been aggravated by AA policies that have driven too many 
whites out of the SANDF before they could transfer their knowledge and skills, and 
those with the necessary skills are often denied opportunities due to the fact that they 
are white, despite the skills shortage15 (Heinecken 2007:83-84). Therefore, it is not 
surprising that an EO and AA climate survey during 2005 indicated that whites 
(64%) are the least positive about the SANDF’s AA policies, with coloureds 
becoming increasingly more negative (DOD 2006). Coloureds claim that in the past 
                                                
15 This has often resulted in posts staying vacant for long periods in the hope that the 
‘right” appointment of colour can be made. This notonly impacts on the morale of 
others having to carry the work load until such appointments can be made, but on 
the organizational effectiveness of the SANDF as well. 
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they where not ‘white enough’ and now they are discriminated against for not being 
‘black enough’. Yet, despite the fact that Africans have benefited greatly from AA, 
41% still felt that “equal opportunities” are not available to them, while 49% of 
whites thought everyone has equal benefits.  
Although racial tolerance may have improved, one cannot say that there is racial 
harmony in the SANDF. As one witness in the Setai Commission stated, “if you 
have black and white, you will have racism, and if you have black and black of 
different cultures, you’ll still have problems” (Setai Report 2001). There is still a 
high degree of racial tension and racism in the SANDF. However, much of the racial 
tension is driven by the past inequalities (and feeling of inferiority) in education and 
perceived standards of training, rather than race per se (Dube and Gifford 1999:1-2).  
Gender, sexuality and culture 
Race has dominated the discourse in the SANDF, although not to the total 
exclusion of gender issues. Since 1996, great stride  have been made to improve the 
gender profile and to remove barriers that restrict he full integration of women. To 
illustrate this, the percentage of women serving in the SANDF increased from an 
average of 11% in 1994 to 13% in 2000 to 19,5% in October 2007. In addition, 
women comprise almost 11% of the senior leadership positions rank Brig-Gen and 
above. The question is whether this is enough. Some claim that women must number 
at least 15% of an organisation to be viewed as more than a token, and 30% if they 
are to be a critical mass to ensure that they are heard (Pinch 2006:6). Here it is of 
interest to note that, while only 11% of women served in the senior ranks of Brig-
Gen and above by October 2007, they were well repres nt d in the junior officer 
ranks of 2nd Lieutenant/Lieutenant (35%) and Captain (36%). Should these women 
remain in the military, a critical mass of 30% proposed by government may well be 
achieved within the next decade.  
The racial/gender profile of the SANDF has also changed markedly over the past 
decade (Table 4). In 1994, white women made up 81% of the female component; 
today they represent 22% with the majority being African women 65%. While they 
are well represented in the lower officer ranks (around 22%), at troop level white 
women make up less than 3% of privates. This may pose s me challenges for the 
SANDF in future, especially where women’s leadership is not be accepted by male 
counterparts. 
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Table 4: Racial gender profile of the SANDF (as percentages) 
 1994 2000 2007 
Asians 0,8 1 1 
African 13 48 65 
Coloured 5,2 8 12 
White 81 43 22 
Note: Figures cited for only uniformed women serving i  the SANDF (civilians 
excluded). 
As for career options, whereas in the former SADF women served only in 
supportive roles such as finance, personnel, logistics, intelligence, medical services 
and welfare, today women in the SANDF have an open career. While many still 
serve in these supportive roles, by October 2007, an estimated 14% served in the 
armour corps, 18% in artillery, 8% as infantry, 21% in combat navy and 6% as 
aircrew (including pilots).16 Women receive the same training as men and there is no 
gender discrimination except with respect to facilities and certain drill adaptations 
that are considered fair discrimination based on physiological differences. This does 
not mean that prejudice against women serving in the more hard-core combat roles 
does not exist (Heinecken 2002:715-728).  
A survey among women in 2001 showed that 60% of women believed that men 
are threatened by female counterparts performing similar duties. In a follow-up 
study in 2004, focusing specifically on the deployment of women in peace support 
operations, this view persisted (DOD 2004:5). Men were particularly guarded in 
their views of whether women should serve in the Special Forces that require 
exceptional endurance, courage, mental strength and the ability to operate alone and 
far behind enemy lines for lengthy periods of time. Men still consider women more 
suited to support positions because they are physically weaker. In reality, few 
women have managed to complete the elite paratroope or Special Forces courses 
successfully, but even where they have ‘out-maled mn’, they frequently continue to 
feel inferior.  
Besides gender differences, the way women perceive their integration into the 
military as differing by race. Menon and Kotze (2007:86) found that white women 
feel less empowered and integrated in the military because they are not regarded as 
professional “career” soldiers, serve mainly in support roles, and face role ambiguity 
                                                
16 Although this may sound impressive, many of these women may wear the corps 
badge but are employed in personnel or logistical posts. 
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in terms of home-maker versus career roles. Black women experience 
disempowerment due to cultural impediments, sexual harassment, family stress and 
their greater childcare responsibilities. This shows that there is a cultural-gender 
divide, where white women feel disempowered due to institutional constraints, while 
black women experience subordination rather in terms of traditional African culture.  
An aspect that is often ignored, but which is central to the discrimination women 
experience in the military is the double standard of sexual morality that both reflects 
and reinforces gender inequality. Within the military, women are often judged by 
their sexuality in a variety of ways. Mankayi (2006:44-64) for example, found that 
men accuse women of using their sexuality to “achieve success in the system”, in 
other words to get promotion or preferential treatment. Women’s sexual conduct is 
also judged differently. Unlike in the case of men, where sexual prowess is admired 
by peers, sexual assertiveness in women is seen to subvert military discipline and 
authority. For a woman to be a respected soldier sh needs to be an honourable 
woman or face being assigned derogatory labels such as ‘state mattress’, ‘whore’ or 
‘slut’, or otherwise ‘lesbian’ (Mankayi 2006:59). Sexual harassment and abuse 
continues to be a major problem facing women serving in the SANDF, although this 
is significantly underreported for a number or reasons, such as the impact it may 
have on their future career prospects (Maughan 2006:1). 
The rights of homosexuals in the SANDF have not yet fea ured prominently on 
the diversity agenda of the SANDF. Although homosexuality is legally permitted it 
is a “silent right” and has remained in the private sphere, but this does not mean that 
discrimination does not exist (Heinecken 1999). An Equal Opportunity survey 
conducted in 2003 showed that there is substantial prejudice and stereotypes 
regarding gays and lesbians. These range from concerns about the impact 
homosexuals may have on the spread of HIV/Aids, possible abuse of authority 
(seniors harassing juniors), the impact “openly gay” may have on morale, the impact 
on combat effectiveness, the sharing of the same facilities and issues of immorality. 
Most felt that homosexuals ‘are still in the closet’ because they are afraid of being 
rejected, scorned, oppressed, victimised, criticised and publicly judged (EOCD 
2004). As such, few incidences have been reported. 
Ethnicity and cultural accommodation 
Besides race and gender, there is the issue of ethnic and cultural diversity. Many 
of the present military traditions have British origins, and for years the SADF was 
dominated by Afrikaner Christian culture, which, according to Mashike (2007:614), 
was equated with military culture. As such, many former SADF members “found it 
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difficult to accept members wearing traditional decorations such as sangoma17 
bracelets” and there was little understanding of and sensitivity for different cultural 
practices. Many Africans still feel that their culture is not accommodated within the 
“SANDF culture”. Typical problems experienced include the lack of recognition by 
superiors of the importance assigned to certain cultural ceremonies, the need to 
attend funerals of extended family members, the desire to consult traditional healers 
and to communicate with the ancestors and the acceptance of customary marriages 
and dependants (Setai Report 2001:34). 
To accommodate this, an array of policies have been ither adapted or 
implemented to include the various cultural practices and beliefs of members. The 
SANDF Dress Policy was revised to allow members to wear certain religious 
adornments, for example, the Zulu custom of Isiphandla (a piece of cattle or goat 
skin worn on the wrist), Lakshimi string (band of seven strands of red cotton), the 
cultivation of a beard and a moustache by men (to show Islamic, Jewish or Shembe 
orthodoxy), the fez or turban worn by men (prescribed y various Islamic traditions) 
and the official mourning button or band (DOD 2002). In addition, a special leave 
dispensation was introduced that allows members up to five days “special 
responsibility” leave to attend funerals (DOD 2003). 
The African practice of having multiple spouses (upto five wives) has been 
accommodated as has customary marriages. Life partners are also recognised, 
whether this is of two persons of the opposite or the same gender. This entitles the 
dependants to enjoy the same benefits as dependants of Western marriages, 
including medical benefits. At present, the right to consult traditional healers instead 
of registered medical practitioners is not recognised and members have to take 
normal leave instead of sick leave if they wish to do so. This remains a point of 
contention, but increasingly, as time goes by, policies and practices are being 
adapted to accommodate African traditions and cultural practices. Then again, many 
young Africans who have come to adopt a Westernised value system, find 
themselves in conflict with their own traditional culture as they are pressurised to 
conform to traditional rituals such as circumcision, respect for elders, the role of 
traditional healers, and so forth. 
Another cultural aspect is the tension between indiv dualism and collectivism. In 
general, whites display a stronger sense of individual sm, where merit and individual 
performance serve as strong incentives to achieve. Africans tend to be more 
collectivist, stressing sharing “ubuntu” (humaneness) and a sense of community 
                                                
17 Sangomas are traditional healers and are believed to possess special healing 
powers. 
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(Eaton and Louw 2000). Individual self-interest is frowned upon, especially if it is to 
the detriment of the group. This has led to some tension on military courses, where 
whites prefer to be evaluated individually, rather than as part of a syndicate or 
group. This too is changing. A study by Van Dyk and De Kock (2004:90-95) among 
young officers attending the South African Military Academy found that there was 
no longer the extreme adherence to forms of individualism or collectivism assigned 
by race. Thus, one also needs to consider the “generation gap” in managing 
diversity, a dimension frequently ignored in diversity programmes.  
Managing cultural diversity 
Based on the preceding discussion it is clear that managing diversity within such 
a diverse environment is extremely complex and it has not been met with great 
success in South Africa (Grobler, Marnick, Carrell, Elbert and Hatfield 2006:79). 
The same applies to the SANDF, which has introduced various programmes to 
increase employee knowledge on multi-cultural issue and to promote racial 
tolerance. In most cases, the approach has been typicall  “maximalist”, dealing with 
culture in terms of ideal-type national differences (Hofstede 1991). According to 
Human (1996:51), this approach is often “value-laden and can “create either positive 
or negative self-fulfilling prophecies”. This could be one of the reasons for the 
failure of the first diversity management programme i plemented in the SANDF.18  
Shortly after integration in 1994 and before AA started in earnest, the SANDF 
first tried to approach diversity management by implementing a truth and 
reconciliation process referred to as the Psychological Integration Programme (PIP). 
The first phase was for members to discuss their felings of guilt, bitterness, fear or 
anger – to get these feelings ‘out in the open’ – so that all could be sensitised to the 
different perceptions that exist. People were obliged to reveal their private feelings 
and subjected to uncomfortable and invasive psychological exercises. After this, the 
next step was to address aspects of cultural diversity in order to create an awareness 
of the different cultures. The last phase aimed to bring about unity among the many 
diverse groups that needed to be integrated (Heinecke  2007:88-89). 
PIP failed dismally in its attempt to create respect for cultural diversity on 
account of a number of reasons. The inability of facilit tors to defuse tensions that 
arose in the first phase, created even deeper sentiments of resentment. The 
facilitators focused on the ills of apartheid, which made former SADF personnel feel 
that they have been unfairly accused and blamed for actions for which they were not 
                                                
18 For a more detailed overview of all the different diversity programmes 
implemented, see Heinecken (2007:77-94). 
 42 
directly responsible. The result was that, instead of creating unity, the programme 
increased divisiveness and animosity and exacerbated existing tensions. According 
to Von Bergen, Soper and Foster (2002:24), this is a common mistake in diversity 
management, “namely, that respect for diversity will be enhanced if the sexism and 
racism of individual employees is confronted, challenged and eliminated”. 
Consequently, the facilitators failed to make the transition to the last phase, to 
facilitate unity. As a result, the programme lost credibility and was abandoned. 
The next attempt was to include diversity management as part of the Civic 
Education Programme of the Department of Defence. Th  hard lessons learnt from 
PIP led the SANDF to move away from the issues of race, but towards an 
explanation of what constitutes culture, how to bring about cultural change and the 
negative consequences of stereotypes and prejudice. Civic education formed part of 
all military developmental courses. The idea was that everyone in the DOD would 
gain an understanding of what management of diversity and equal opportunities 
entails. However, as with PIP the lack of adequately trained personnel to present the 
cultural diversity programmes resulted in it being disbanded towards the end of 
2003. This component of the Civic Education Programme was replaced by a section 
focusing on shared values (DOD 2003). The shift wasan attempt to move away 
from the focus on cultural differences to the need to create one universal military 
culture acceptable to everyone serving in the SANDF, irrespective of race, military 
background, creed, religion or gender. This was the first real attempt to create a 
more universal organisational culture based on corevalues within which diversity 
can be tolerated, valued and accommodated.  
After the creation of the Equal Opportunities Chief Directorate (EOCD), this 
directorate developed its own diversity management course based on the Equal 
Opportunities Advisors Course presented at the Defenc  Equal Opportunity 
Management Institute (DEOMI) in Florida in the mid-nineties onwards. In the US 
armed forces, DEOMI has a long and successful history of dealing with issues of 
racial discrimination, gender issues and sexual harassment (Moskos 2007:16). It also 
trains equal opportunity advisers and the SANDF has sent numerous members to 
attend these courses. Subsequently, the EOCD developd its own courses to ‘train’ 
people how to manage diversity and deal with labour relations matters. The EOCD 
five-week course was designed to alert designated officers19 on the nature, origin 
and ramifications of discrimination and to increase their knowledge and 
                                                
19 Previously, this was the task of the multi-tasked functionaries, who served at the 
various general support bases. However, with the restructuring of the SANDF, units 
now nominate a specific person in the unit to deal with these issues, such as the 
Adjutant or Communications Officer. 
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understanding of EO and AA. The topics discussed during these courses included 
aspects relating to socialisation, communication across cultures, power and 
discrimination, racism, sexism and religious discrimination, sexual harassment, 
conflict management and affirmative action.  
Besides this training course, middle management was also encouraged to attend 
a four-day management of diversity seminar, one for middle-ranking officers 
(Captains and Majors) and another for Warrant Officers and Senior Non-
Commissioned Officers. This course was divided into various phases. In the first 
phase, participants were requested to expand on how t ey perceive the concepts of 
race, gender, ethnicity, culture, attitudes, personal differences and socio-economic 
class. Here the facilitators explained that there are different layers of diversity based 
on (1) one’s own personality traits, (2) internal dimensions of diversity as a result of 
socialisation, (3) external influences such as income, personal habits, religion, 
educational background, and lastly (4) organisationl factors, which include aspects 
such as seniority, division, work location, union affili tion and management status. 
Hereafter, the way these four layers of diversity filter one’s own perception of the 
world and of others were examined. Participants were r quested to explain how 
these perceptions and stereotypes impact on communication and relationships in the 
work environment. They were also asked to debate how t is could influence mission 
readiness and goal accomplishment (Heinecken 2007:9-91). 
Having seen how diversity filters can influence work relations, the impact of 
communication in a culturally diverse work setting was then examined within this 
seminar. Specific attention was paid to factors that shape prejudice based on race 
and gender, the different sources of power various groups have (such as education, 
language, military background) and how certain stereotypes and perceptions 
influence one’s behaviour. The final phase of the seminar looked at the benefits of 
having a diverse workforce and the long-term advantages of managing diversity 
effectively. By means of practical examples it was illustrated how this improves the 
utilisation of the organisation’s human capital, how it can reduce interpersonal 
conflict, enhance mutual respect, foster a shared organisational vision and 
commitment, stimulate innovation (as more ideas from different viewpoints lead to 
better solutions to everyday problems) and how it can improve productivity and 
organisational effectiveness.  
Unlike the emphasis on AA and EO, which have merely brought about 
workplace diversity, the latter programmes tended to adopt a more minimalist 
approach to diversity management with the focus on cultural diversity. 
Unfortunately, these programmes where never fully institutionalised and they are no 
longer presented, some claim because there is not the capacity to do so, others that 
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they are no longer necessary. After all, the political imperative of workplace 
diversity has been achieved.  
Conclusions 
Largely as a result of government’s assertive AA policies, the South African 
armed forces are for the first time in history broadly representative of society. The 
targets set by the Defence Review in 1996 have been xceeded. National 
commitment to promote not only racial, but also gender equality has added a new 
dimension to diversity management in the SANDF. Whereas initially the focus was 
on correcting past racial imbalances, in recent years the shift has been on improving 
the gender representation not only in terms of numbers, but also across all branches 
(including combat branches). However, getting the numbers rights means nothing, if 
those representing the numbers are not valued and respected. Although many 
women now serve in traditionally male-dominated branches, they have not reached a 
sufficient critical mass to be fully accepted as equals, nor has the unique 
contribution they can make been fully endorsed.  
This may change in future as the SANDF’s gender mainstreaming initiatives 
take hold. At a recent conference on soliciting male support for gender equality, an 
appeal was made for men to support gender mainstreaming, to join the fight against 
gender inequality and to recognise the unique contributions women can make. While 
their value is slowly being acknowledged, the challenges greater numbers of women 
serving in the armed forces pose in terms of return on investment, retention, their 
unique needs as women, issues of cultural subordination nd sexual abuse have not 
been fully grasped. The extent to which these factors and the greater deployment of 
women on peacekeeping operations may have on operational effectiveness, remains 
to be seen. In terms of diversity management, this has not received enough attention 
primarily because the focus has been on getting the numbers right. 
While the SANDF has made great steps in removing racial and gender 
discrimination and improving its legitimacy among the broader populace, this has 
come at a price. The exodus of a large number of experienced white SANDF 
officers, before their skills could be adequately transferred has evoked concern. Yet, 
at the same time, AA continues to alienate and frustrate many whites who remain 
clustered in the middle ranks. Despite their loyalty nd long-term experience, they 
recognise that political expedience counts more when it comes to appointments and 
promotions. The following comment by a senior white naval officer highlights their 
frustration: 
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I feel that as a White senior officer with scarcely needed skills in a 
branch that is not attractive to Africans my service is no longer wanted 
or needed based on the colour of my skin. I find this very hard to 
accept as I serve my country and service [arm of service] just as 
loyally as in the past. My goal of attaining rank after a successful 
career is no longer achievable. For the first time I need to think of 
another career in the medium term (Heinecken 2007:83). 
This sense of alienation has left many disillusioned, demoralised and resentful. 
Drawing on lessons from the private sector, Human (2005:52) has pointed out that 
“organisations that play the numbers game tend to lose staff that are not from the 
dominant group”. This has been the case in the SANDF, which has not only affected 
retention, but also recruitment of minority groups. Many white youth aspiring to a 
military career have opted to join the armed forces of other commonwealth 
countries, even sacrificing their citizenship to do so. Other long-serving experienced 
white officers and non-commissioned officers have in turn opted to join the growing 
private security sector, which has evoked great poli ical concern. 
Although the DOD’s AA and EO strategies have brought about the desired 
workplace diversity, one cannot say that these policies have embraced the unique 
strengths diversity has brought. The hard approach to diversity management has not 
led to a productive environment where all feel valued and where everyone’s talents 
are fully recognised. Despite various attempts to improve the understanding of how 
culture and power impact on workplace relations, such attempts have been met with 
limited effect as they have not formed part of the ov rall human resource strategy of 
the SANDF. Whether this is due to a lack of capacity, or because these programmes 
are no longer considered necessary since the military is sufficiently representative, is 
an open question. The fact that minority groups (whites, coloureds and Indians) feel 
increasingly alienated does not appear to be an issue of great political concern, 
possibly because former revolutionary soldiers have benefited greatly from the 
DOD’s AA and EO policies.  
As many party loyalists come to dominate the senior and middle officer ranks, 
concern is raised about the impact this may have on the political neutrality of the 
armed forces. The opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, has warned that the 
“ANC is slowly but surely taking control over the defence force” (Van Eeden 
2005:5). In the SANDF, former force and past political loyalties have been more of 
a dividing force than ethnicity. On this point it would be interesting to observe to 
what extent appointments of senior leadership may change should Jacob Zuma 
assume presidency, given the under-representation of Zulus in the SANDF. How 
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these racial and ethnic tensions will affect civil-m itary relations in this fledgling 
democracy is yet to be seen, but it should be closely monitored.  
For some, diversity management may be a ‘soft’ issue in terms of defence 
priorities, but it could have ‘hard’ consequences for the SANDF. Not only does a 
lack of sensitivity to diversity issues increase misconceptions, leading to under-
performance, discrimination, ill-discipline and poor work relations, but it also affects 
the operational effectiveness and legitimacy of the armed forces. Should the SANDF 
become unrepresentative and should leadership continue to comprise of party 
loyalists, then there is some unease over the long-term impact this may have for 
civil-military relations and the political stability of South Africa. Recent events in 
Zimbabwe and our own apartheid legacy should be sufficient warning for us to take 
diversity management more seriously. 
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